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Abstract 
 
The euro area is facing crisis, while the US is not, though the overall fiscal situation and 
outlook is better in the euro area than in the US, and though the US faces serious state-level 
fiscal crises. A higher level of fiscal federalism would strengthen the euro area, but is not 
inevitable. Current fiscal reform proposals (strengthening of current rules, more policy 
coordination and an emergency financing mechanism) will if implemented result in some 
improvements. But implementation might be deficient or lack credibility, and could lead to 
disputes and carry a significant political risk. Introduction of a Eurobond covering up to 60 
percent of member states’ GDP would bring about much greater levels of fiscal discipline 
than any other proposal, would create an attractive Eurobond market, and would deliver a 
strong message about the irreversible nature of European integration. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
European fiscal integration is at crossroads. The fiscal crisis that has swept through Europe in 
the past couple of months has tested European monetary union and made it apparent that the 
current institutional setup – and its implementation – is insufficient. A major overhaul is 
needed.  
 
Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, serious concerns have been expressed about US 
state and local government defaults (Gelinas, 2010). The spectre of 'the mother of all financial 
crises' has even been raised should the state of California default (Watkins, 2009). In late 
February 2010, Jamie Dimon, chairman of JP Morgan Chase, warned American investors that 
they should be more worried about the risk of a Californian default than about Greece's 
current debt woes1. But the US's state-level fiscal crisis has received much less attention than 
the difficulties in the euro area.  
 
In fact both the US and the euro area face significant state-level fiscal crises, which are 
reflected by credit default swap (CDS) developments – a measure of the cost of insurance 
against government default (Figure 1). But neither the euro area as a whole, nor the US as a 
whole is going through a fiscal crisis. Paradoxically, while anxiety about the euro area has 
reached a very high level, both public debt and deficit are noticeably smaller in the euro area 
than in the US (Table 1). 
 
Figure 1: Credit default swap on five-year government bonds in selected EU countries 
and US states, 2 January 2008 - 9 September 2010 
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Source: Datastream. 
 
It is against this background that this paper aims to answer three questions: 
• Why has the euro area been hit so hard? 
• How would a more federal European fiscal union closer to the US model have helped? 
• How do the euro area’s fiscal architecture reform plans stand up in the light of the US 
example? 
 
                                                 
1 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/financialcrisis/7326772/California-is-a-greater-risk-than-
Greece-warns-JP-Morgan-chief.html  
 3
Section 2 briefly compares some general features of the EU and US fiscal systems. This is 
followed by a more detailed comparison of fiscal-crisis prevention and management tools in 
Section 3. The lessons are drawn out in Section 4, and some concluding remarks are offered 
in Section 5. 
 
Table 1: The euro area versus the US: some key indicators, 2009-2011 
 
* US government debt data is the sum of federal, state and local government debt – the concept better 
corresponds to the ‘general government debt’ statistics of the EU. US federal government debt is 83.3, 94.3, and 
99.0 percent of GDP in 2009, 2010, and 2011 respectively. It is notable that the US data is published by the IMF 
as ‘General government gross debt’ and by the European Commission as ‘General government consolidated 
gross debt’, and this is almost identical to what the US Census Bureau calls ‘Gross federal debt’, ie not including 
state and local government debt.  
** The values reported for the euro area are estimates correcting for reporting errors. 
Source: European Commission (2010) for all data except US government debt, which is from 
http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/federal_state_local_debt_chart.html  
 
 
2 CENTRALISATION, REDISTRIBUTION, AUTONOMY AND COMPETITION 
 
It is useful to start with a brief comparison of the EU and US fiscal systems. Table 2 shows 
the distribution of tax revenues in the US: the federal government collects two-thirds, the 
states one-fifth, and local government the rest. As state budgets receive some direct funding 
from the federal government, the state and local government share of total spending is 
somewhat higher than 40 percent. States have a high level of autonomy, there is a great deal 
of variation in tax rates and structures, and tax competition between states is high (Gichiru et 
al, 2009; Bloechliger and Rabesona, 2009). 
 
In the EU sovereign countries provide the bulk of the EU budget in the form of contributions 
largely related to their gross national income and value added tax revenues. EU countries have 
full autonomy in setting their budgets2 and tax competition is pervasive, much like US states. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 compare the centralisation of revenues and the distribution of expenditures by 
the US federal government and the EU budget3. There is indeed a huge difference between the 
EU and the US. In the US, federal taxes collected from states range from 12 to 20 percent of 
state GDP, and federal monies received by states range from nine to 31 percent of state GDP 
(not considering the District of Columbia). In the EU, most member states contribute to the 
common budget by amounts equivalent to about 0.8-0.9 percent of their GDP, and receive EU 
                                                 
2 Within the weak limits of the EU-wide Stability and Growth Pact and other EU regulations, such as state aid 
rules. 
3 For the US, it is not straightforward to calculate a proper balance of payments between the federal government 
and the states. To our knowledge, Leonard and Walder (2000) is the most recent study to perform such a 
calculation, which relates to the 1999 fiscal year and we therefore use their data. 
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funds in the range of 0.5-3.5 percent of their GDP. As a consequence, fiscal redistribution is 
much higher in the US than in the EU4. Also, while in both areas redistribution is related to 
the level of development as measured by GDP per capita, the relationship is much steeper in 
the US (as shown by Figure 4). 
 
Table 2. Distribution of revenue by tax type collected by all federal, state, and municipal 
governments in the US, 2006 (%) 
 
Source: Gichiru et al (2009), Table 3, page 12. 
 
 
 
 
BOX 1: FISCAL FEDERALISM 
“The traditional theory of fiscal federalism lays out a general normative framework for the 
assignment of functions to different levels of government and the appropriate fiscal 
instruments for carrying out these functions (e.g., Richard Musgrave 1959; Oates 1972).” 
(Oates, 1999, p. 1121). Through fiscal operations at federal government and regional level, 
and through direct fiscal transfers across regions, a federal fiscal system typically provides 
redistribution (permanent transfers mostly from richer to poorer regions), stabilisation 
(counter-cyclical federal government fiscal policy when all regions are hit by a common 
shock) and risk-sharing (temporary transfers when only one region or some regions are hit by 
a region-specific shock). In practice, there are various forms of fiscal federation (see eg von 
Hagen and  Eichengreen, 1996; Gichiru et al, 2009; or Bloechliger et al, 2010), even though 
the US has always been the main point of reference. Europe’s supranational formation, the 
EU, can also be regarded as a form of fiscal federalism, since certain functions, such as the 
common agricultural policy or cohesion policy, are largely centralised. The literature on fiscal 
federalism is voluminous; see for example the recent handbook edited by Ahmad and Brosio 
(2006) and its extensive reference list. Our paper deals with a single issue: the prevention and 
management of state fiscal crises in the EU and the US. 
 
                                                 
4 Cohesion fund disbursement for the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 is set to increase from about 
0.7 percent of the combined GDP of these countries in 2008, to above two percent by 2012. Hence redistribution 
will increase somewhat, but will continue to remain well below US levels. 
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Figure 2: US federal budget: taxes from, spending in, and balance with states, 1999, % 
state GDP 
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
D
is
tr
ic
t O
f C
ol
um
bi
a
N
ew
 M
ex
ic
o
M
on
ta
na
W
es
t V
irg
in
ia
M
is
si
ss
ip
pi
N
or
th
 D
ak
ot
a
V
irg
in
ia
A
la
sk
a
A
la
ba
m
a
H
aw
ai
i
S
ou
th
 D
ak
ot
a
O
kl
ah
om
a
A
rk
an
sa
s
M
ai
ne
M
ar
yl
an
d
Lo
ui
si
an
a
K
en
tu
ck
y
S
ou
th
 C
ar
ol
in
a
M
is
so
ur
i
Id
ah
o
A
riz
on
a
T
en
ne
ss
ee
Io
w
a
R
ho
de
 Is
la
nd
V
er
m
on
t
K
an
sa
s
W
yo
m
in
g
N
eb
ra
sk
a
P
en
ns
yl
va
ni
a
U
ta
h
N
or
th
 C
ar
ol
in
a
F
lo
rid
a
G
eo
rg
ia
T
ex
as
O
hi
o
In
di
an
a
W
as
hi
ng
to
n
O
re
go
n
C
ol
or
ad
o
C
al
ifo
rn
ia
D
el
aw
ar
e
M
as
sa
ch
us
et
ts
N
ew
 Y
or
k
W
is
co
ns
in
M
ic
hi
ga
n
M
in
ne
so
ta
N
ev
ad
a
Ill
in
oi
s
N
ew
 H
am
ps
hi
re
N
ew
 J
er
se
y
C
on
ne
ct
ic
ut
Taxes
Spending 
Balance
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from http://www.hks.harvard.edu/taubmancenter/publications/fisc/ 
(fiscal data) and OECD regional database (GDP). 
 
Figure 3: EU budget: contribution from, spending in, and balance* with member states, 
2008, % member state GDP 
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* EU administrative spending is excluded from the balance.  
Source: Author’s calculations using data from 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/documents/2008_en.htm?go=t3_3#table-3_2 (fiscal data) and Eurostat (GDP). 
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Figure 4: Fiscal redistribution within the US and EU vs GDP per capita, (A) individual 
US states and EU member states and (B) major regions 
 
Note: data relates to 2008 for EU and 1999 for US. US: federal expenditure in the given state minus federal taxes 
from the given state, percent of state GDP. In panel A, District of Columbia (300, 40.8%) is not shown for better 
readability. EU: total EU expenditure (less administration) in the given country minus total country contribution 
to the EU budget, percent of country GDP. In panel A Luxembourg (276.1, -0.03%) is not shown for better 
readability. See the explanation of the two-digit regional codes in the appendix. Group values are weighted 
averages; weights were derived from nominal GDP. For the US we used the divisions defined by the Census 
Bureau (District of Columbia is not included in the South Atlantic average). For the EU the groups are the 
following: CEE10: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia; MED5: Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Portugal and Spain; UK&IE: Ireland and the United Kingdom; 
NORD3: Denmark, Finland, and Sweden; ABLN4: Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands; France 
(FR), Germany (DE) and Italy (IT) are shown separately. 
Source: See Figures 2 and 3. 
 
 
3 CRISIS PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT 
 
The huge differences in centralisation and redistribution, however, do not tell us much about 
the potential role of the EU and US fiscal systems in preventing and managing state-level 
fiscal crises, which, as noted in the introduction, is a problem both for the EU and the US. 
 
We compare the euro area with the US in eight ways. Firstly, there are three main areas that, 
in principle, can help to prevent or alleviate state-level crises in a federal system: 
 
1. Fiscal rules: fiscal rules in a federal system, such as the US, tend to be much more 
stringent than in the EU/euro area. Thus there is less potential for irresponsible behaviour. 
Most US states have balanced budget rules in their constitutions: a study concluded that 36 
states have rigorous balanced-budget requirements, four have weak requirements, and the 
other 10 fall in between those categories (National Conference of State Legislatures, 1999; 
Snell, 2004). Yet, as Figure 1 shows, CDS on bonds from some US states5 increased to higher 
values than any euro-area country after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, 
and current US state CDSs are similar to those of Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, though 
none have reached current Greek values. California, whose fiscal rules belong to the 'most 
stringent' category noted above, is perhaps in the deepest trouble among US states. Its cash 
constraints even led to the issuance of vouchers to the value of $2.6 billion between July and 
September 2009, which may in fact be considered to be an event very similar to a default6. 
 
                                                 
5 CDS is available only for 15 of the 50 US states and hence we can not assess the other 35 states. 
6 Barro (2010) argues that California has been in a state of budget crisis for at least the last seven years, 
stemming from institutional failures. 
 7
2. Less scope for state/local debt: because a high share of revenues and expenditures are 
centralised in a federal system, and state-level fiscal rules are in general strict, state spending, 
even if irresponsible, does not have the potential to lead to massive debt/GDP ratios. Indeed, 
the combined debt of US states and local governments amounted to about 16 percent of US 
GDP in 2006. This ratio is expected to rise somewhat by 2010 to 22 percent on average 
(Figure 5)7 with reasonably small cross-state differences: the range is from 9.3 percent in 
Wyoming to 33.0 percent in Rhode Island (source: www.usgovernmentspending.com). In the 
euro area the debt/GDP ratio in 2010 ranges from 19.0 percent in Luxembourg to 124.9 
percent in Greece (European Commission, 2010). However, the lower US state and local 
government debt/GDP ratios can be serviced from lower revenues, as a substantial fraction  
of revenues must be transferred to the fiscal centre. 
 
Figure 5: US gross public debt: federal, state, and local, 1902-2012 (percent of US GDP) 
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Note. 2010-2012 values (plus 2009 value for states and 2008-2009 values for local governments) are estimates 
(partly based on budgets) by usgovernmentspending.com.  
Source: http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/federal_state_local_debt_chart.html. 
 
3. Federal stabilisation policy may help to avoid pro-cyclicality: There are good reasons to 
delegate counter-cyclical fiscal policy to the centre (IMF, 2009; Martin, 1998): it allows better 
or easier policy coordination, exploits economies of scale by relying on a large tax base and 
better borrowing conditions, and also provides risk-sharing opportunities. During the current 
crisis, the US federal government indeed allowed automatic stabilisers to run and adopted a 
major discretionary stimulus including direct help to state budgets. In the EU, such counter-
cyclical policies were left to each member state with some attempt made at coordination. But 
have fiscal outcomes been different in the EU and the US? 
 
In the US counter-cyclical fiscal policy directed from the centre was counter-balanced by 
fiscal consolidation at state level. McNichol and Johnson (2010) calculate a measure of state 
                                                 
7 During the same years, federal government debt has increased from 63 percent to 94 percent of US GDP. The 
small increase in state and local debt is largely due to fiscal consolidation required by fiscal rules.  
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budget shortfall (the difference between projected revenues for each year and a ‘current 
services’ baseline) that reflects state fiscal conditions before deficit-closing actions are taken. 
States use a combination of measures to close the deficits, including deployment of federal 
stimulus funds, budget cuts, tax increases and reserves8. Table 3 shows that, while state 
budgets have indeed received direct federal support through the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA), and states could rely to some extent the reserves accumulated in 
their rainy-day funds, but spending cuts and tax increases could not be avoided. 
 
Table 3: Estimated US state budget shortfall in each fiscal year, US$ billion 
 
Sources: Total and ARRA contribution: Figure 3 on page 5 of McNichol and Johnson (2010); others: CBPP 
preliminary unpublished estimates based on a sample of states. 
 
 
Similarly, Bloechliger et al (2010, p 19) note that among OECD countries “the USA is 
probably the most notable case of pro-cyclical reactions from sub-central governments”. They 
also report a contemporaneous correlation between net lending and output gaps, which is 0.36 
for the federal government (implying counter-cyclicality), but -0.38 for US states (implying 
pro-cyclicality). Using lags, the correlation coefficient for states is around -0.66 implying 
even stronger pro-cyclicality. In a more formal study, Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) assessed 
the aggregate impact of federal and state spending during 2008/2009. They concluded that the 
big federal stimulus broadly compensated for the contraction of state level spending. In net 
terms, stimulus was close to zero in the US in 2008/2009. And by studying seven fiscal 
federations (including the US) and about two decades of data mostly from the 1980s and 
1990s, Rodden and Wibbels (2010) conclude that pro-cyclical fiscal policy among provincial 
governments can easily overwhelm the stabilising policies of central governments. These 
results are for the average of the US states: in more distressed states, the combined effect of 
federal and state spending may have led to procyclical fiscal policy. Figure 6 shows that 
states' own spending was cut on average by about four percent in the fiscal year 2009 and 
about an additional seven percent in the fiscal year 2010, but there were some states with 
much higher cuts, eg 12 states cut own spending by more than 10 percent (and four others 
between 9 and 10 percent) in the fiscal year 2010. 
 
                                                 
8 Following the recession of the early 1980s, the number of US states with rainy-day funds rose from 12 in 1982 
to 38 in 1989, and to 45 in 1995. The aim of these funds is to smooth public spending during recessions and, 
possibly, increase public savings over the business cycle. See Box 1 in Ter-Minassian (2007). 
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Figure 6: General fund state spending in the US, fiscal years 1990-2010 (annual % 
change) 
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Note. General Fund: the predominant fund for financing a state’s operations; revenues are received from broad-
based state taxes. All data refers to the fiscal year (which ends in most states in June of each year). The time 
series for ‘all states’ is taken from the Spring 2010 Survey. Data for each state and for each year was taken from 
the Fall Surveys (except in 2010) and correspond to changes of expenditure in current fiscal year compared to 
the previous year, where previous fiscal year data is ‘actual’ and the current fiscal year data is ‘preliminary 
actual’. The 2010 fiscal year data is the estimate published in June 2010. Source: The Fiscal Survey of States, 
Fall Surveys and Spring 2010 Survey, National Governors’ Association and the National Association of State 
Budget Officers, http://nasbo.org/Publications/FiscalSurvey/FiscalSurveyArchives/tabid/106/Default.aspx  
 
 
In the EU, during the first phase of the crisis in 2008/09, almost all euro-area members 
adopted discretionary fiscal measures. The exceptions were Cyprus, Greece, Italy and 
Slovakia (according to the European Commission(2009). But primary balances also worsened 
between 2008 and 2009 in these countries, implying that, at the very least, automatic 
stabilisers were allowed to work9,10. In 2010, Greece adopted several fiscal austerity 
programmes, and Portugal and Spain also speeded-up fiscal consolidation, while Italy 
announced plans for 2011. More recently France and Germany set out plans for 2011 and 
beyond. In our view France and Germany should not rush to fiscal consolidation at a time 
when European recovery is still fragile and private sector deleveraging is still expected. 
                                                 
9 The change in primary balances between 2008 and 2009 were the following: in Greece from - 3.1 percent to -
8.5 percent, in Italy from +2.5 percent to -0.6 percent, in Cyprus from +3.7 percent to -3.6 percent, and in 
Slovakia from -1.1 percent to -5.3 percent (all values are expressed in percent of GDP; source: European 
Commission, 2010). In Greece, the 2009 recession was reasonably mild, GDP fell by 2 percent only, suggesting 
that the ballooning primary deficit may have also represented discretionary countercyclical fiscal policy (perhaps 
partly as a consequence of a loose budget ahead of the late 2009 parliamentary elections). 
10 Dolls, Fuest, and Peichl (2010) find that automatic stabilizers work better in the EU than in the US. They find 
that automatic stabilizers absorb 38 per cent of a proportional income shock in the EU, compared to 32 per cent 
in the US. In the case of an unemployment shock 47 percent of the shock are absorbed in the EU, compared to 
34 per cent in the US. This cushioning of disposable income leads to a demand stabilization of up to 30 per cent 
in the EU and up to 20 per cent in the US. Yet they also find large heterogeneity within the EU. 
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Nevertheless, in 2010, the fiscal stance is still expansionary in most euro-area countries, 
including Germany and France. 
 
While final fiscal numbers for 2010 are not yet available, it is fair to say that there are states 
both in the euro area and the US that had to deal with pro-cyclical fiscal policy a some point 
during the crisis, and there are states that could benefit from counter-cyclical fiscal policy. 
Therefore, from the point of view of actual outcomes, the superiority of federal stabilisation 
policy cannot be established when we compare the euro area to the US11. 
 
 
The next three areas in which the EU and the US can be compared indicate significant 
similarities in the context of the resolution of fiscal crises: 
 
4. No orderly default mechanism: neither the EU nor the US has a default mechanism for, in 
the EU case member states, and in the US case states (although the US has a default 
mechanism for lower levels of government, though under stricter rules than for private 
corporations; see Gelinas, 2010). 
 
5. No bail-out from the centre: at least prior to the crisis, there were no bail-out or short-
term financing mechanisms in the US for states, or in the EU for euro-area governments. 
President Gerald Ford at first refused New York city a bailout in 1975, and President Barack 
Obama said no to California in 2009. In the former case, ultimately both the US federal 
government and New York state provided loans to the city, but they imposed a financial 
control board that required deep cuts to services, a new, more transparent budget process and 
several years of budgetary oversight (Malanga, 2009). But it was in Europe, not the US, 
where a formal emergency lending facility was put together, and it was the European Central 
Bank that started to buy the government bonds of distressed member states. 
 
6. No option to devalue the currency and to inflate the debt: neither euro-area countries 
nor US states have the devaluation option, though it could boost growth and thereby help 
fiscal sustainability, or to generate inflation in order to reduce the real value of debt.  
 
But there are also two fundamental differences between the EU and the US that have a 
bearing on fiscal sustainability: 
 
7. Banking system strength: the US is regarded as having implemented effective measures 
to improve its banking system, while Europe has not (Véron, 2010). In a federal fiscal system, 
where banking regulation and supervision are also centralised and therefore cross-border 
banking issues are not relevant, fixing the financial system is certainly easier.  
 
8. Labour and product market flexibility: the US is closer to an optimum currency area 
than the EU in these respects. In fact, in the context of this paper, Mankiw (2010) reminded us 
that “the United States in the nineteenth century had a common currency, but it did not have a 
large, centralised fiscal authority. The federal government was much smaller than it is today. 
In some ways, the US then looks like Europe today. Yet the common currency among the 
                                                 
11 Fatás (1998) compared the EU and the US in terms of fiscal stabilization and risk-sharing using, of course, 
data from the pre-EMU period. He concluded that the differences between the federal US system and the 
decentralised EU system are not as great as previously thought. He argued that the potential to provide 
interregional insurance by creating a European fiscal federation is too small to compensate for the many 
problems associated with its design and implementation. See Pacheco (2000) for an overview of several other 
papers written on this issue in the pre-EMU. 
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states worked out fine.” His key point is that the common currency worked well even when 
there were severe recessions, because labour markets were much more flexible than in Europe 
today. 
 
 
4 LESSONS FOR EUROPE 
 
Although both the euro area and the US have many similarities in terms of the state-level 
fiscal crisis, only the euro area's viability has been questioned, though the overall fiscal 
situation is better in the euro area than in the US. 
 
4.1 Why has the euro area been judged so harshly? 
 
A simple, but in our view insufficient, answer is that the Greek fiscal problems are much 
more serious than fiscal problems in any US state. Greece has a real solvency problem: high 
debt, high deficit, weak tax-collection capability, social unrest and a loss of confidence. No 
US state is in a similar situation. Even if the current IMF/euroarea financing programme goes 
ahead as planned, the Greek debt/GDP ratio would stabilise at around 150 percent of GDP in 
a country with very weak fiscal institutions. Should any other negative shock arrive, or should 
the programme not go ahead as planned, Greece will not be able to avoid default or debt 
rescheduling. 
 
A second reason for the more serious fiscal crisis in the euro area is that a Greek default may 
have more severe contagious effects within the euro area than would the default of a state in 
the US. Debt levels in euro-area member states are much higher (both relative to GDP and in 
absolute terms) than in US states, and a significant share of euro-area sovereign debt is held 
by European banks, while in the US residents hold a large part of state debt. Little is known in 
Europe about the resistance of individual banking groups to eventual sovereign defaults (Gros 
and Mayer, 2010), though for the banking system as a whole there seems to be a sufficient 
buffer (OECD, 2010). 
 
A third factor is the ambiguous policy response. When the Greek crisis began to intensify in 
February 2010, the Greek government was hesitant about adopting further consolidation 
measures, and European partners dithered over making a loan to Greece and agreeing to IMF 
involvement (which, by the way, is not prohibited by any EU regulation). As the crisis 
intensified, policymakers started to blame ‘speculation’12, or suggest ad hoc measures, such as 
banning certain financial products and setting up a European credit rating agency. When 
policymakers are busy with these kinds of redundant activities and provide conflicting signals 
about their intentions, markets are likely to draw the conclusion that policymakers do not have 
the means to resolve the crisis. 
 
Last but not least, the euro-area institutional setup may have also played a role, with the lack 
of a strong federal government, which ultimately would have had ample resources to bail-out 
big banking groups or even perhaps states. Gros and Mayer (2010) also rightly point out that 
the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve stand shoulder-to-shoulder, each one providing a 
guarantee for the other, which is not the case in the euro-area. Also, while the euro is much 
more than a simple economic endeavour, the commitment of the US to the US dollar is 
                                                 
12 While theoretical models make the case for pure self-fulfilling crises, the current euro-area fiscal crisis is not 
one. It was not accidental that Greece was attacked and not, for example, Finland, and it was also not accidental 
that Portugal was threatened most by contagion and not, for example, Slovakia. The perceived fragility of the 
European banking industry was a key contributor to the fear of contagion.  
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certainly stronger than the commitment of euro-area nations to the euro, even if the eventual 
exit of a member state or a full break-up of the euro-area would lead to an economic chaos 
(Eichengreen, 2007). 
 
4.2 How would a more federalist European fiscal union have helped? 
 
A more federalist EU/euro area would have helped to prevent and resolve the current state-
level fiscal crisis in various ways. 
 
1. It would have increased the political coherence of the euro area. Since a major factor 
behind the euro-area fiscal crisis is low confidence related to governance deficiencies and the 
inability of European authorities to strengthen the euroarea banking system, a higher level of 
fiscal federation, and also political federation, would have boosted confidence. Furthermore, it 
would have meant fewer opportunities for policymakers in member states and European 
institutions to express conflicting views. While being an important argument for a more 
federalist Europe, these political aspects should not necessarily be a problem if other items on 
the list are fixed, resulting in the minimising of the potential for an area-wide crisis on one 
hand, and clear procedures on how to resolve an area-wide crisis on the other. 
 
2. It would have given scope for greater redistribution, risk sharing, and a federal 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy that may have dampened the effect of consolidation in those 
few member states that started to consolidate in 2010. We have already argued that the 
superiority of the US fiscal stabilisation policy over to Europe's cannot be established. Even 
in the US the moral hazard involved in federal counter-cyclical fiscal policy is a major 
consideration (Aizenman and Pasricha, 2010). This would not be different for Europe. 
However, it is important to emphasise that the lack of a European federal stabilisation policy 
is only consistent with counter-cyclical country-level fiscal rules and therefore this feature 
should be incorporated in country-specific rules and be maintained or even strengthened in the 
SGP13. 
 
We intentionally do not discuss here the broader issue related to the level of redistribution, 
because it is, as eg Oates (1999) argues, a contentious and a very complex economic and 
political issue. We only note that Greece, the main culprit of the current euro-area crisis, was 
the highest net beneficiary (as a percent of GDP) of intra-EU redistribution (Figure 2), and it 
has received much more than what the relationship between net balance with the EU and GDP 
per capita would suggest (Figure 3A). It was not the low level of intra-EU redistribution that 
caused the crisis. Similarly, public risk sharing is also a contentious issue. Its desirability 
depends on, among other things, private risk sharing. But financial integration advanced to 
very high levels within the euro area, which can substitute public risk sharing. 
 
3. It would have reduced the scope for state-level crises through stricter pre-crisis state-
level fiscal rules. It is inevitable that measures will be taken to implement fiscal rules more 
effectively than has been done under the SGP. But this does not necessarily require a fiscal 
federation. Most US states have constitutional fiscal rules – the approach adopted recently by 
Germany. Other euro-area members may also choose this approach, preferably augmented 
with the introduction of independent fiscal councils (Calmfors et al, 2010), thereby increasing 
their credibility and fiscal sustainability. While these improvements would be beneficial, there 
                                                 
13 While the SGP required EU countries to have budget positions close to balance or in surplus in the medium 
term, the actual interpretation and implementation relied instead on the three percent deficit ceiling. During the 
crisis, however, the Commission has – rightly – invited all EU countries to break the three percent deficit ceiling. 
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is an even better way to enforce fiscal discipline: the introduction of a common Eurobond up 
to a limit of 60 percent of member states’ GDP, as we shall discuss in the next section. 
 
4. It would have helped to strengthen the euroarea banking industry and to introduce 
euroarea-wide banking-resolution schemes. Resolving European cross-border banking-
sector crises seems to be a tough job and, indeed, looking at our list, this is the best argument 
for a more federal approach. As discussed in the previous section, the perceived fragility of 
the euro-area banking industry was a major reason why the Greek crisis has caused so many 
problems. But, in principle at least, banking crisis resolution can be done through a burden-
sharing mechanism without creating a US-style federal fiscal system. The implementation of 
EU/euro-area-wide banking supervision and regulation is not impossible within the current 
institutional setup. 
 
4.3 How do the euro area’s fiscal architecture reform plans stand up in the light of the 
US example? 
 
Numerous solutions to the euro area's fiscal crisis have been put forward. Current discussions 
suggest that reform of the euro-area governance framework will mostly comprise:  
  
1. Better enforcement of fiscal discipline, which in turn will likely have two key components:  
• Stricter enforcement of current rules, partly through fines; 
• More fiscal coordination. 
 
2. The €440 billion three-year European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) may be turned to 
a permanent emergency financing mechanism for euro-area member states funded (or 
guaranteed) primarily from national contributions; the Commission’s €60 billion European 
Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM) may also be made permanent; 
 
3. Active involvement of the ECB in state-level crisis management, and 
 
4. Surveillance of private-sector imbalances and better harmonisation of economic policies. 
 
These proposals would introduce institutions that do not exist for the US states, though they 
certainly would imply higher levels of integration. Since the EU has a completely different 
political set-up to the US, and since the level of government debt in euro-area member states 
is very diverse, European solutions need not follow the US model. 
 
Nevertheless, both the EFSF and the ECB’s active involvement are, to some extent, 
substitutes for the lack of a substantial federal European budget. US federal spending in US 
states is of course not to be repaid by the states. In Europe, loans, not transfers, were provided 
to Greece, and the EFSF and ESM will also provide, if needed, loans conditional on the 
implementation of a programme. In this way, these European institutions help member states 
when they face difficulties in obtaining market financing14. But since we have argued that it 
was not the lack of higher redistribution across European countries that caused the crisis, and 
also that greater redistribution is not the solution, the EFSF indeed substitutes to some extent 
the lack of a higher EU budget. 
 
                                                 
14 The US government also helped US states and local governments to borrow through the Build America Bond 
(BAB) programme (Ang et al, 2010). This programme is designed to help state and local governments pursue 
various capital projects. Therefore, BAB is very much different from the European lending facilities, which 
provide general funding for budget deficits. 
 14
Also, the move of the ECB to give special treatment to Greece via its collateral policy, and to 
purchase the government bonds of just a few euro-area countries breaches the barrier between 
monetary and fiscal authorities, because these actions reduce the cost of borrowing for euro-
area governments. Both conditional lending and the ECB’s purchase of government securities 
may give rise to public risk sharing, as we shall argue below. 
 
While progress with the current European reform proposals would certainly improve the euro-
area policy framework compared to before the crisis, we doubt that points one, two and three 
in the list at the start of this section really represent the best path towards reform of the euro-
area fiscal architecture. There are two main reasons for our doubts: credibility (which 
primarily relates to fiscal discipline enforcement tools) and political risk (which primarily 
relates to the EFSF and the ECB’s involvement). 
 
Credibility of the new instruments: much will of course depend on the details of the new 
framework. So far, the credibility of any European instrument has been damaged by a series 
of U-turns. We can give four major examples. First, until February 2010 the euro-area had a 
framework in which no support was to be provided to fiscally profligate countries: this 
principle was dropped very quickly to help out a country that has flouted the rules 
extensively15. Second, during the crisis, the European Central Bank has substantially reduced 
the quality requirements for collaterals eligible for refinancing operations, but planned to 
return to pre-crisis standards by January 2011. Until early 2010, the ECB very explicitly 
denied that it would switch its planned return of collateral policy back to pre-crisis standards. 
Since the credit rating of Greek government bonds has been downgraded, a return to pre-crisis 
collateral policy has raised the risk of exclusion of Greek government bonds. But the ECB 
first postponed the return and later even abolished any credit rating requirement for Greek 
government bonds (and just for Greek bonds). Third, many European policymakers strongly 
opposed IMF involvement in the rescue of a euro-area country, but there was a U-turn in this 
respect as well. Fourth, the ECB long denied the need for, and its willingness to, purchase 
government bonds of distressed member states, but it has since done exactly this. These U-
turns in many cases were reactions to events, but if it is believed there will be similar changes 
to the new instruments in the future, their credibility will be undermined from the outset. 
 
Political risk: the emergency financing mechanism for euro-area member states carries a 
significant political risk16. If donor countries must pay too much to help out others, especially 
if some of those others have been irresponsible in the past and they eventually default, then 
the citizens and politicians of donor countries will be deterred from risking future losses. The 
IMF and EU loans have seniority over previous market-financed debt and therefore an 
eventual default may not necessarily imply direct losses for donor countries. But when 
emergency lending amounts to a significant fraction of the GDP of the recipient country, 
losses even of senior loans cannot be excluded in the event of default. Furthermore, since the 
ECB has purchased government debt securities that now have junior status, direct losses can 
arise there. Also, an eventual default, the possibility of which has previously been strenuously 
denied, may bring into question the reliability of similar financing programmes and could also 
raise the risk perception of donors. The eventual consequences of the denial of future funding 
by some donor countries could be disastrous, especially if it happens after the current three 
year temporary EFSF is transferred into a permanent facility. 
                                                 
15 Article 122 of Treaty, which allows the provision of financial assistance to a Member State when “exceptional 
occurrences beyond its control” occur, was certainly not applicable for the bail-out of Greece. 
16 There are many other well founded arguments against a formal emergency financing mechanism and even for 
allowing member states to default sometimes, see eg Wyplosz (2009), Enderlein (2010), Mélitz (2010), or 
Cochrane (2010). 
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Given the above risks, what would then be a proper way to reform the euro-area’s fiscal 
architecture? It is clear that more fiscal discipline is needed and it is also clear that a simple 
elimination of the EFSF after its expiry without any bold action to put something new in place 
would risk a wave of uncertainty. A clear, credible and simple solution is needed. Such a 
solution could be the introduction of a common Eurobond as suggested by Delpla and von 
Weizsäcker (2010). Member states would be entitled to issue jointly guaranteed Eurobonds, 
but only up to 60 percent of GDP (‘blue bond’). They would issue any additional bond with 
their own guarantee (‘red bond’). The blue bond would be senior to the red bond and an 
orderly sovereign default mechanism could be put in place for the red bonds. By construction, 
this would mean a credible commitment by euro-area partners to not bail-out the red part of 
sovereign debt. Thereby, this mechanism would provide an extremely strong incentive for 
countries to convince markets that their red debt is safe, promoting fiscal discipline much 
more powerfully than any other fiscal coordination proposal currently on the table. Being both 
sensible and bold, the introduction of blue and red bonds would carry a strong political 
message that Europe’s integration cannot be reversed16. 
 
 
5 SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The euro area faces a deep crisis while the US does not, although the overall fiscal situation 
and outlook is better in the euro area than in the US, and although the US also faces serious 
state-level fiscal crises. Pre-1999 critics of the euro project, who stressed its fragility because 
of the low level of labour mobility and the lack of fiscal and political union, now feel that 
their concerns have been vindicated. 
 
But is there proof that the euro is not viable without a federalist fiscal architecture? Our 
answer is no, even though there is no doubt that such an architecture would have helped to 
prevent out-of-control state-level debts and allow smoother resolution of banking-system 
problems, as the US example clearly demonstrates. Also, a more federalist set-up would be a 
signal of the political coherence of the euro area and would offer less scope to European 
policymakers to alarm markets with conflicting commentaries. 
 
Indeed, the euro area's current fiscal woes primarily originate from the risk that a single 
country will default and from the fear of contagion to other countries and the banking system, 
which is perceived to be fragile. These fears were amplified by the ambiguous policy response 
and the institutional deficiencies of euro-area governance. But the origin of the euro-area 
fiscal crisis is not the lack of a federal fiscal institution with higher redistribution, stabilisation 
and risk-sharing roles, which are the typical activities of a fiscal union. The case for a federal 
stabilisation instrument can only be made if new reforms will constrain member states in 
carrying out counter-cyclical policy in bad times, while not forcing it on them in good times.  
 
There is a large number of proposals on the table about the redesign of the euro-area policy 
framework, and the most likely outcomes will not make Europe’s fiscal framework more 
similar to that of the US. Considering various aspects of crisis prevention and management 
this is not necessarily a problem, if Europe can find effective solutions to the challenges of its 
institutional set-up and cross-border banking issues. 
 
It still needs to be seen if Europe will be able to implement proper reforms. Among the most 
likely outcomes, the expected scrutiny of private sector imbalances is to be welcomed 
enthusiastically, but we are doubtful about the other likely elements of the new framework, 
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namely the strengthening of current rules possibly through fines, more fiscal policy 
coordination, an emergency financing mechanism and the ECB’s active involvement in the 
management of sovereign debt crises. While these would be improvements compared to the 
current set-up, they may not be effective and could lead to even more disputes among member 
states and European institutions, and they may simply require further change should new 
circumstances emerge. Therefore, these new instruments may not be seen as sufficiently 
credible. Lack of credibility of new instruments may translate into continued concerns about 
the viability of the euro project, which could deter investment and negatively impact 
economic activity, even in fiscally sound countries. The permanent emergency-financing 
mechanism could create moral hazard and carries a serious political risk: donor countries may 
decline to provide further funding after an eventual sovereign default.  
 
Instead of requesting huge sums of money from euro-area partners to bail-out actual or 
perceived profligate countries, designing new fines with a potential of future overlooking, and 
creating more platforms for fiscal coordination with the potential of even more unsettled 
disputes, it would be much more reasonable to introduce a common Eurobond along the lines 
of Delpla and von Weizsäcker (2010). That would bring about much more fiscal discipline 
than any other fiscal coordination and enforcement proposal currently on the table, would 
create a large, liquid, and therefore attractive Eurobond market, and would carry a strong 
message about the irreversible nature of European integration. The three-year period during 
which the current EFSF will be in place is sufficient to properly design the Eurobond. This 
period should also be used to fix the fragility of the euro area’s banking system.  
 
Yet the euro area has a more entrenched problem than the fiscal sustainability of some of its 
member states: the inability of some Mediterranean economies to address their 
competitiveness problems within the euro area (European Commission, 2008; Darvas, 2010; 
Marzinotto, Pisani-Ferry and Sapir, 2010), which has already led to disappointing growth 
performance in Italy and Portugal during the first decade of the euro, and unfortunately 
Greece and Spain may join this club. This problem is more difficult to solve than the fiscal 
crisis, because fostering private sector adjustment is very hard and depends not just on 
government decisions. Also, since Europe is culturally diverse, solutions that work in one 
country may not work in another. Helping member states with serious competitiveness 
problems to design and accept necessary structural reforms is of utmost importance, as are 
measures to move the whole euro area, including its labour market, towards an optimum 
currency area. 
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APPENDIX 
Regional codes for Figure 4A  
EU  USA 
AT Austria LV Latvia  AK Alaska KY Kentucky NY New York 
BE Belgium MT Malta  AL Alabama LA Louisiana OH Ohio 
BG Bulgaria NL Netherlands  AR Arkansas MA Massachusetts OK Oklahoma 
CY Cyprus PL Poland  AZ Arizona MD Maryland OR Oregon 
CZ Czech 
Republic 
PT Portugal  CA California ME Maine PA Pennsylvania 
DE Germany RO Romania  CO Colorado MI Michigan RI Rhode Island 
DK Denmark SE Sweden  CT Connecticut MN Minnesota SC South 
Carolina 
EE Estonia SI Slovenia  DC District of 
Columbia 
MO Missouri SD South 
Dakota 
ES Spain SK Slovakia  DE Delaware MS Mississippi TN Tennessee 
FI Finland UK United 
Kingdom 
 FL Florida MT Montana TX Texas 
FR France    GA Georgia NC North 
Carolina 
UT Utah 
GR Greece    HI Hawaii ND North Dakota VA Virginia 
HU Hungary    IA Iowa NE Nebraska VT Vermont 
IE Ireland    ID Idaho NH New 
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WA Washington 
IT Italy    IL Illinois NJ New Jersey WI Wisconsin 
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